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Research examining the neural mechanisms associated with error awareness has
consistently identified dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activity as necessary but not
predictive of conscious error detection. Two recent studies (Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010;
Wessel et al., 2011) have found a contrary pattern of greater dorsal ACC (dACC) activity
[in the form of the error-related negativity (ERN)] during detected errors, but suggested
that the greater activity may instead reflect task influences (e.g., response conflict,
error probability) and or individual variability (e.g., statistical power). We re-analyzed fMRI
BOLD data from 56 healthy participants who had previously been administered the Error
Awareness Task (EAT), a motor Go/No-go response inhibition task in which subjects make
errors of commission of which they are aware (Aware errors), or unaware (Unaware errors).
Consistent with previous data, the activity in a number of cortical regions was predictive
of error awareness, including bilateral inferior parietal and insula cortices, however, in
contrast to previous studies, including our own smaller sample studies using the same
task, error-related dACC activity was significantly greater during aware errors when
compared to unaware errors. While the significantly faster RT for aware errors (compared
to unaware) was consistent with the hypothesis of higher response conflict increasing
ACC activity, we could find no relationship between dACC activity and the error RT
difference. The data suggests that error awareness is associated with error-related dACC
activity but that the role of this activity is probably best understood in relation to the activity
in other regions. Activity in the dACC may be important to conscious error detection, but
it remains unclear what task and individual factors influence error awareness.
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INTRODUCTION
Goal directed behavior requires the ability to recognize appro-
priate responses and to flexibly adjust behavior in response
to an error. Even in the absence of explicit feedback, people
demonstrate characteristic reactions following an error and often
spontaneously correct their response (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001;
O’Connell et al., 2009). These behaviors suggest the activity
of a performance monitoring system, which evaluates actions
and allows adaptive adjustments in attention and cognitive con-
trol mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of repeating an error
(Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001). Cognitive neuroimaging
research has consistently implicated the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in error processing
(Garavan et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Moreover,
hypoactivity in this network has been associated with deficits
in error-related processing and subsequent behavioral adjust-
ments observed in populations with schizophrenia (Morris et al.,
2006), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Burgio-
Murphy et al., 2007), Alzheimer’s disease (Mathalon et al., 2003),
and substance use disorders (Franken et al., 2007).
It has been suggested that error processing can proceed, at least
in part, outside of conscious awareness. We are not aware of every
error we commit and research explicitly assessing error awareness
has shown that even spontaneously corrected errors can go unre-
ported (Endrass et al., 2005, 2007; Wessel et al., 2011). Although
some post-error adaptations can occur outside of awareness,
Ullsperger and colleagues (2010) argued that conscious awareness
is critical to the affective significance of an error. It is likely that the
affective evaluation of one’s performance influences overall moti-
vation and longer-term strategic approach to the task. Reduced
awareness of errors has been associated with a lack of insight into
maladaptive behaviors in drug addiction (Hester et al., 2007),
ADHD (O’Connell et al., 2009), and psychopathy (Brazil et al.,
2009). It is important, therefore, to understand the conditions
under which errors reach consciousness and the neural correlates
of error awareness.
Electrophysiological research has consistently associated a
positively deflecting event-related potential (ERP) observed
100–200ms following an error (the error positivity: Pe) with
awareness of the error (Endrass et al., 2005; Overbeek et al., 2005).
Typically, the Pe is reduced or absent for those errors of which the
participant remains subjectively unaware. It has been suggested
that the Pe may be a context specific P3, a component associated
with attentional orienting to stimuli of motivational significance
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2009). The P3/Pe is believed to arise from
activity in the prefrontal and parietal cortices (Soltani and Knight,
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2000), and is recorded as an average over a centro-parietal elec-
trode site. Functional neuroimaging research corroborates these
suggestions in implicating a network of frontal and parietal
regions in error awareness, notably the insulae (Hester et al., 2005,
2009a; Klein et al., 2007), bilateral inferior parietal (Hester et al.,
2005, 2009a), and bilateral mid frontal (Hester et al., 2005, 2009a)
cortices.
Performance monitoring is also associated with a negatively
deflecting ERP that occurs immediately following the erroneous
response, the error-related negativity (ERN) (Falkenstein et al.,
1991), which is believed to reflect a stage of error processing that
is functionally distinct from that reflected in the Pe (Overbeek
et al., 2005). For example, although the ERN is significantly
larger following an error than a correct response (Dehaene et al.,
1994), ERNmagnitude does not reliably discriminate aware from
unaware errors (Endrass et al., 2005; O’Connell et al., 2007; but
cf. Scheffers and Coles, 2000 and refer Wessel in this issue for a
comprehensive review). It has been suggested that the ERN rep-
resents encoding of an element of the task environment or of task
performance associated with errors; specifically, it has been pro-
posed that the ERN reflects response conflict (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Yeung et al., 2004), thwarted reward expectations (Holroyd
et al., 2004), or detected changes in error likelihood (Brown and
Braver, 2005).
The ERN has been localized to the ACC (Halgren et al., 2002;
Debener et al., 2005; Wang et al., 2005) and fMRI research is
largely consistent with the ERP findings in showing that, although
BOLD activity in dorsal ACC (dACC) is greater for errors than
correct responses, this region is not sensitive to error aware-
ness (Hester et al., 2005, 2009a; Klein et al., 2007). The role
of the ERN/dACC in error processing is unclear, but elevated
levels of dACC activity have been associated with error-related
autonomic arousal (Critchley et al., 2005) and with more con-
servative responding following an error, measured as post-error
slowing (PES) of reaction time (RT) (Garavan et al., 2002; Kerns
et al., 2004). Autonomic arousal and PES have been shown to be
reduced or absent following unaware errors (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001; Endrass et al., 2007; O’Connell et al., 2009). It is “surpris-
ing” (Klein et al., 2007, p. 1779), therefore, that those studies that
have explicitly examined the role of dACC in error awareness have
consistently reported equivalent levels of dACC activity for aware
and unaware errors in healthy controls.
In contrast to the predominance of past research, two recent
studies (Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010; Wessel et al., 2011) have
reported sensitivity in dACC to error awareness in the form of
greater ERN magnitude for aware than unaware errors. While it
appears that these recent findings contradict the extensive liter-
ature on the role of the ERN/dACC, in this issue Wessel reviews
past research and argues that the ERN/dACC is critically involved
in error awareness. Wessel discusses findings of error sensitivity
in the ERN (Maier et al., 2008) and the relationship between
the ACC and awareness in other paradigms (Dehaene et al.,
2003; Mayr, 2004) and suggests that methodological considera-
tions may have obscured the role of ERN in error awareness in
past research. Wessel argues that those studies that limit the time
participants have to acknowledge an error, or in which signal-
ing an error requires an additional “error awareness” response
may induce a conservative response bias in which some liminal
errors go unreported (cf. Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Woodman,
2010; Wessel et al., 2011). Alternatively, it was suggested that the
inconsistent ERN/error awareness relationship might be the result
of low statistical power in the reported studies. After reviewing
past research, Wessel and colleagues (2011) concluded that it is
common for studies to demonstrate numerically larger ERN for
aware than for unaware errors (e.g., Endrass et al., 2007; Hughes
and Yeung, 2011), but that this effect falls short of statistical sig-
nificance. The authors proposed that small sample sizes and low
numbers of unreported errors in past research mean that conclu-
sions that the ERN is not sensitive to error awareness may have
been drawn from research with insufficient statistical power.
Review of the fMRI research suggests that these studies are
also vulnerable to the criticism that they may have lacked suffi-
cient statistical power to determine the presence or absence of a
relationship between the dACC and error awareness. Due to the
practicalities of collecting fMRI data, sample sizes are compar-
atively small and experimental sessions are typically of a length
that limits the number of unreported errors. As with the elec-
trophysiological findings relating to the ERN, fMRI studies have
consistently reported numerically larger BOLD signal change in
the dACC for aware than unaware errors (Hester et al., 2005,
2009a; Klein et al., 2007). The fact that this difference has failed to
reach statistical significance may be due, as was argued to be the
case for ERP research (Wessel et al., 2011), to a lack of statistical
power. Alternatively, a recent investigation usingmultimodal neu-
roimaging techniques (Agam et al., 2011) suggested that the ERN
may originate in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), raising
the possibility of a functional dissociation between the ERN and
activity in the dACC. In light of these suggestions, the relationship
between the dACC, erroneous responses, and error awareness
warrants reinvestigation.
The aim of the present study was to determine whether more
powerful statistical analyses would demonstrate a relationship
between the dACC and error awareness. The present study com-
bined the samples of three previous studies (Hester et al., 2005,
2009a, 2012) to form a group of 56 healthy controls. The stud-
ies employed the Error Awareness Task (EAT: Hester et al., 2005),
a motor Go/No-go task modified to provide a measure of error
awareness and to optimize unaware errors. The behavioral per-
formance and cortical activation levels of the composite sample
were analyzed to reassess the neural mechanisms associated with
error awareness and error-related behavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS AND TASK DESIGN
Fifty-six right-handed participants (seven female, mean age 27,
range: 20–41), reporting no history of neurological or psycholog-
ical impairment, completed a version of the EAT (Hester et al.,
2005). The experimental procedure was approved by the ethics
committees of the relevant institutions (University of Melbourne,
Trinity College Dublin, and University of Queensland), and par-
ticipants provided written, informed consent at the beginning of
the experimental session. The EAT is a motor Go/No-go response
inhibition task, modified to allow participants to acknowledge
errors of commission of which they are aware (refer Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 | The Error Awareness Task (EAT). The EAT presents a serial
stream of single color words in colored fonts. Participants were trained to
respond to each of the words with a single “Go trial” button press, and to
withhold this response when either of two different circumstances arose. The
first was if the same word was presented on two consecutive trials (Repeat
No-go), and the second was if the word and font of the word matched (Color
No-go). To indicate “error awareness” participants were trained to forego the
regular go trial button response and instead to execute the alternative “error
awareness” response following any commission error. Past studies have
demonstrated that error-related BOLD signal is uninfluenced by the
awareness response itself (Hester et al., 2005). Although levels of awareness
undoubtedly vary on a continuum, we made a qualitative distinction between
“Aware” and “Unaware” errors to facilitate our event-related fMRI analysis.
Figure reproduced from Hester and colleagues (2012).
Color names, printed in colored font, were presented in a serial
stream. The three samples completed versions of the task that
differed slightly in the stimulus presentation and inter-stimulus
interval duration, 900/600ms (Hester et al., 2005, 2009a) or
800/700ms (Hester et al., 2012). Participants were instructed
to respond to the presentation of each stimulus with a but-
ton press (a “Go” response) unless the stimulus was a “lure,”
in which case they were to withhold their response (“No-go”
response). Lures could take two forms: a “Repeat lure” in which
the same word was presented on two consecutive trials; and a
“Color lure” defined by the congruence of the color name and
the font color. Color lures were defined by incongruence between
the color word and the font in the two earlier studies (Hester
et al., 2005, 2009a); and by congruence in the third study (Hester
et al., 2012). Adopting competing inhibition rules exploits the
different strengths of the stimulus-response relationships such
that the overlearned behavior of reading a word would make the
Repeat rule more salient than the Color rule. Previous research
has suggested that this may cause the Color rule to be sup-
pressed, producing more Color errors than Repeat errors and
potentially affecting participants’ awareness of the errors (Hester
et al., 2005, 2009a). Participants were instructed to execute an
alternative “error awareness” response on the “Go” trial following
an error.
The 2005 and 2009 studies presented five blocks of 225 trials
during fMRI data acquisition with lure trials pseudo randomly
distributed across the 1125 experimental trials. The 2012 study
presented six blocks of 225 trials. There were minor differences to
the ratio of No-go: Go trials across the three experiments, with
128 lures presented in the earlier study (Hester et al., 2005) and
125 and 150, respectively, in the two later studies (Hester et al.,
2009a, 2012). On average, a lure was presented every 8.95 trials,
corresponding to an average inter-lure interval of 13.42 s. While
some other variations in the design of these tasks existed, only
the commission errors made during the aforementioned design
were considered, with the assumptionmade that the event-related
analysis would minimize the influence of unrelated task variance.
SCANNING PARAMETERS AND DATA ANALYSES
Scanning for the original study (Hester et al., 2005) was con-
ducted using contiguous 5mm sagittal slices covering the entire
brain from a 1.5 T Siemens Vision scanner using a single
shot, T2*-weighted echo-planar pulse sequence (TE = 50ms;
TR = 2000ms; FOV = 256mm; 64 × 64 matrix). High resolu-
tion T1-weighted structural MPRAGE images (FOV = 256mm,
thickness = 1.0mm isotropic with no gap) were acquired prior
to functional imaging to allow subsequent activation localization
and for spatial normalization. Stimuli were delivered using an
IFIS-SA stimulus-delivery system (MRIDevices Corp.,Waukesha,
Wisconsin), which was equipped with a head-coil-mounted
640 × 480 LCD panel. This shielded LCD screen is mounted
on the head-coil, directly in the subjects’ line of vision. Foam
padding was used to limit head movements within the coil.
Scanning for the second study (Hester et al., 2009a) was con-
ducted using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner in which foam padding
was used to restrict head movements. Contiguous 3.5mm
sagittal slices covering the entire brain were collected using a
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TE = 35ms;
TR = 2000ms; FOV = 224mm). High resolution T1-weighted
structural MPRAGE images (FOV = 256mm, isotropic 0.9mm
voxels) were acquired following functional imaging to allow sub-
sequent activation localization and spatial normalization. Stimuli
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were back-projected onto a screen at the subject’s feet and were
viewed with the aid of prism glasses attached to the inside of the
radio-frequency head-coil.
Scanning for the third study (Hester et al., 2012) using a
whole-body 1.5 Tesla Siemens scanner with a gradient-echo
EPI sequence. EPI images were acquired using a gradient-echo
pulse sequence and sequential slice acquisition (TR = 2000ms,
TE = 30ms, flip angle = 90◦, 29 contiguous slices of 3mm thick-
ness, 10% gap, in-plane resolution of 3.6 × 3.6 pixels in a FOV of
384mm). Activation data were registered to high resolution T1-
weighted isotropic (1mm3) structural MPRAGE images. Only the
data from the placebo condition of this study was used for this
reanalysis.
Behavioral data from each participant were used to categorize
the trial events into successful responses (stops), aware errors,
and unaware errors. All analyses were conducted using AFNI
software (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni/) (Cox, 1996). Following
image reconstruction, the time-series data were motion-corrected
using 3D volume registration (least-squares alignment of three
translational and three rotational parameters). Activation outside
the brain was removed using edge detection techniques.
Separate haemodynamic impulse response functions (IRFs)
at 2 s temporal resolution were calculated using deconvolution
techniques for aware errors, unaware errors, and stop events.
Response functions for all regressor events were initiated at
image acquisition onsets because the presentation of all epochs-
of-interest was timed to coincide with the beginning of the
2 s TR-cycle. A non-linear regression program determined the
best-fitting gamma-variate function for these IRFs as previously
described (Murphy and Garavan, 2005). The area under the curve
of the gamma-variate function was expressed as a percentage
of the area under the baseline. The baseline in this design is
indicative of task-related go trial processing that remains after
the variance related to the other types of events have been
removed.
The percentage area (event-related activation) map voxels were
re-sampled at 1mm3 resolution, then spatially normalized to
standard MNI space (MNI 152 template), and spatially blurred
with a 3mm isotropic root mean squared Gaussian kernel. Group
activation maps for errors were determined with one-sample
t-tests against the null hypothesis of zero event-related activation
changes (i.e., no change relative to baseline). Significant vox-
els within group maps passed a voxelwise statistical threshold
(t = 5.23, p ≤ 0.00001) and were required to be part of a larger
84μl cluster of contiguous significant voxels. By using a combina-
tion of probability thresholding and cluster thresholding, the aim
is to maximize the power of the statistical test while holding the
likelihood of false-positives to a minimum. To determine the clus-
ter threshold we use a program called 3dClustSim. The program
is provided with the number of voxels in the group map, the spa-
tial correlation of voxels (must be contiguous on three sides), and
the voxelwise threshold. The program then runs a series of Monte
Carlo simulations (10000 iterations for our study) to determine
the frequency of clusters of varying sizes produced by chance.
From this frequency distribution, we then select the cluster size
(84μl given our parameters) that occurs less than 1% of the time
by chance, to give a threshold of p = 0.01 (corrected).
The activation clusters fromwhole-brain analyses of aware and
unaware errors were used to create an OR map for the purposes
of an ROI analysis. An OR map includes the voxels of activation
indicated as significant from either of the constituent maps, which
are presented in Appendix. The mean activation for clusters in
the combined error map was then calculated for the purposes
of an ROI analysis, deriving mean activation levels for aware
and unaware errors, that were compared using repeated mea-
sures t-tests, corrected via a modified Bonferroni procedure for
multiple comparisons (Keppel, 1991).
RESULTS
Performance indices for the EAT are summarized in Table 1.
Participants correctly withheld their responses on 52.8% of
the No-go trials, with significantly more successful inhibitions
for Color than for Repeat lures (62.6 vs. 42.9%: t(55) = 9.76,
p < 0.001). Participants reported awareness of 82.5% of their
errors (range 15–99%), with a significantly greater proportion
of Color errors endorsed than Repeat errors (85.5 vs. 77.2%:
t(55) = 2.907, p < 0.006). Participants’ awareness of errors was
not related to their inhibition accuracy (r = −0.0115, ns). The
speed of commission error responses was significantly related to
awareness of the error [F(2, 110) = 7.222, p < 0.002, η2p = 0.116].
Post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that this effect was due to
significantly faster responses for aware errors of commission
than for either unaware errors or for correct “Go” responses
[t(55) = 3.403, p < 0.002 and t(55) = 2.680, p < 0.01, respec-
tively].
Behavioral adjustments following No-go trials were assessed
by calculating the difference between RT for the trials that imme-
diately preceded and succeeded the lure. Participants demon-
strated significant speeding of responses following aware errors
[t(55) = 10.519, p < 0.001]. This finding is inconsistent with
other reports, in which participants slow their rate of respond-
ing following an error (Rabbitt, 1966) and this PES is exacerbated
by error awareness (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001). Reductions in
RT following aware errors have consistently been reported using
Table 1 | Behavioral performance: inhibition accuracy and reaction
time on the EAT.
Category Mean (SD)
INHIBITION ACCURACY (%)
Color lure 42.9 (23.6)
Repeat lure 62.6 (21.9)
ERROR AWARENESS (%)
Color lure 85.5 (17.7)
Repeat lure 77.2 (19.9)
REACTION TIME (ms)
Go trial 488.2 (14.93)
Aware error 479.1 (16.99)
Unaware error 535.7 (22.88)
POST-LURE ADJUSTMENT (POST-LURE RT—PRE-LURE RT)
Correct inhibition −118.1 (100.90)
Aware error −124.0 (88.24)
Unaware error 27.3 (81.14)
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the EAT and it is possible that the post-error speeding observed
in this paradigm is due to participants learning that lures were
widely spaced. This suggestion is consistent with the significant
decrease in RT for the Go trial following a correct inhibition
[t(29) = 118.124, p < 0.001], but is confounded by the fact that
following aware errors, participants will execute the “awareness”
response without the need to process the post-lure stimulus. PES
was observed following errors of which the participant remained
unaware [t(55) = 2.517, p < 0.02]. In order to verify that this
effect was not due to strategic slowing of RT with increasing tem-
poral distance from the last perceived lure, a surrogate data-set
was generated by selecting Go trials that occurred at the same
point following a consciously perceived lure as the unaware error
trial. When comparing RT for those trials that immediately pre-
ceded and succeeded the surrogate trials, no significant difference
was observed [t(38) = 0.53, ns], suggesting that post-unaware
error slowing was not due to changes in response strategy across
trials.
The event-related functional analysis of aware and unaware
errors identified eight clusters that showed significantly greater
increases in activity associated with aware errors than unaware
errors (Table 2). Consistent with previous reports, we observed
error awareness sensitivity in clusters in the bilateral insula cor-
tices (Figure 2C) and the IPL (Figure 2B). We also revealed activ-
ity in midline structures (dACC, pre-SMA, and SMA; Figure 2A)
that discriminated aware from unaware errors1. When repeating
the analysis on a subset of participants who endorsed an equiv-
alent number of color and repeat lure errors [t(31) = 2.01, ns],
activity in all eight of the clusters identified in the full sample
continued to show greater levels of BOLD activity associated with
aware than with unaware errors.
Although dACC activity was sensitive to error awareness,
there was no relationship between dACC activity and behav-
ioral measures typically associated with error awareness. The
speed with which errors of commission were executed was
1Note that, although the center of mass of activity in these midline structures
is reported as falling in the left hemisphere, the lateral extent of these clusters
was such that the bilateral dACC, pre-SMA, and SMA can be considered to
discriminate between aware and unaware errors.
not associated with the degree of increase in dACC activity
for either aware (r = −0.04, ns) or unaware (r = −0.047, ns)
errors. Nor were post-error RT adjustments correlated with the
change in dACC activity for either aware (r = −0.064, ns) or
unaware (r = −0.007, ns) errors. The magnitude of the discrep-
ancy between BOLD activity in the dACC associated with aware
errors and that associated with unaware errors was not related
to the speed with which erroneous responses were made or the
post-error adjustments in RT.
For aware errors, the relative speed of the erroneous response
was related to activity in the SMA (r = 0.309, p < 0.03), such
that slower aware error RT (relative to average Go trial RT) was
associated with higher levels of activity in this region. Following
an aware error, the post-error adjustment in RT (post-error RT-
pre-lure RT) was negatively correlated with activity in the R-IPL
(r = −0.277, p < 0.04) and with both clusters centered on the
L-IPL (r = −0.312, p < 0.022 and r = −0.330, p < 0.023), such
that greater levels of activity in these regions predicted greater
speeding of RT on the post-error trial. Unaware error RT and
post-unaware-error RT were not correlated with BOLD activity in
any of the functionally defined ROI. For none of the ROI did the
magnitude of the discrepancy between BOLD activity associated
with aware errors or that associated with unaware errors correlate
with the speed with which erroneous responses were made or the
post-error adjustment in RT.
DISCUSSION
The current study was designed to reassess the relationship
between dACC activity and error awareness in light of recent
reports that an electrophysiological measure of dACC activity
(ERN) discriminated aware from unaware errors (Steinhauser
and Yeung, 2010; Wessel et al., 2011). In addition to regions
previously implicated in error awareness when assessed using
the EAT, the insula and the bilateral IPL (Hester et al., 2005,
2009a), we demonstrated that aware errors were associated with
significantly greater BOLD signal change in the dACC and sup-
plementary motor cortex (SMC) than unaware errors. Although
2Center of Mass MNI co-ordinates: x = −49, y = −34, z = 50.
3Center of Mass MNI co-ordinates: x = −51, y = −47, z = 40.
Table 2 | Regions that showed significantly greater BOLD signal change for aware than unaware errors.
Structure p Vol. µl Brodmann Area HS Center of mass (MNI Coordinates)
x y z
Inferior parietal <0.00005 1332 40 L −49 −34 50
Inferior parietal <0.0007 2758 40 R 49 −49 40
Inferior parietal/SMG <0.0004 1135 40 L −51 −47 40
dACC <0.0006 1510 32 L −1 19 39
Insula <0.03 813 13 L −36 14 2
Insula <0.004 1167 13 R 44 13 4
MidCingulate/pre-SMA <0.01 216 6 L −3 −14 52
SMA <0.0004 107 6 L 0 −3 61
Positive values for x, y, and z coordinates denote, respectively, locations that are right, posterior, and superior relative to the anterior commissure. Significance test
results indicate areas of increased activation associated with aware relative to unaware errors assessed using t-test.
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FIGURE 2 | Awareness of errors was associated with significantly
greater activation in midline structures. [(A) sagittal slice at x = −1. Red
cluster centered on the dACC, blue cluster centered on the SMA, green
cluster centered on the pre-SMA)], the bilateral IPL [(B) red cluster centered
on the L-IPL, yellow cluster centered on the L-IPL/SMG, blue cluster
centered on the R-IPL], and insulae [(C) axial slice at z = 0]. Bar graphs
represent mean %BOLD signal change relative to baseline for aware and
unaware errors.
the dACC showed error sensitivity, there was no direct correla-
tion between error-related activity in this region and behaviors
typically associated with error awareness (error RT and post-
error RT). For this reason, and because this awareness sensi-
tivity was only observed when reanalyzing a composite sample
of 56 participants, we suggest that the relationship between
dACC, error awareness, and error-related behaviors is indirect
and best understood in relation to the activity in other brain
regions.
An indirect relationship between dACC and error-related
behaviors is consistent with the predictions of a model recently
described by Holroyd and Yeung (2011). The authors suggested
that the dACC is involved in the selection and evaluation of
appropriate sequences of actions directed to attaining a particular
goal (Botvinick et al., 2009), rather than the constituent actions
themselves. For example, error-related activity in the dACC may
index competition between multiple response strategies or the
negative reinforcement of an unsuccessful strategy. If activity in
the dACC is related to long term goal attainment, rather than
the value of individual responses, it is possible that it reflects
an aggregation of performance relevant information such as
motivational significance, response selection parameters, and the
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efficient balance between speed and accuracy. In the context of
error processing, activity in the dACC may need to surpass a cer-
tain threshold (Yeung et al., 2004) for awareness and post-error
adjustments to occur. In this way, activity in the dACC would
covary with error commission and contribute to the likelihood
that an error will reach awareness, but may not be sufficient to
produce awareness in isolation.
Increased activity in the insula cortex has consistently been
associated with error awareness (Hester et al., 2005, 2009a; Klein
et al., 2007), an effect that is likely due to the central role of the
insula in interoceptive awareness (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig,
2009). The insula is implicated in the regulation and awareness
of autonomic responses (Critchley et al., 2000; Craig, 2002) and
error-related activity in the autonomic nervous system (ANS) is
greater following an aware than an unaware error (O’Connell
et al., 2007, 2009). There is evidence that dACC provides top-
down input to systems regulating autonomic activity (Critchley
et al., 2001, 2002) and that the resulting visceral sensation is per-
ceived as a “feeling,” indexed by insula activity (Critchley, 2005).
Craig (2009) described this relationship as the ACC signal provid-
ing a measure of the motivational significance of an event, which
is interpreted in the insula in the context of information about
social and cognitive conditions to produce awareness of an event
and the actor’s subjective experience of it. This model is consistent
with the suggestion that error-related activity in the dACC may
feedforward into regions directly responsible for error awareness
(Wessel et al., 2011).
The relationship between the dACC, ANS response, and the
insula provides a possible means by which activity in the dACC
could mediate error awareness. It is unclear, however, what is
communicated by the dACC signal. One influential hypothesis
argues that dACC activity indexes conflict or dissonance, in the
form of a mismatch between two possible response mappings
(Coles et al., 2001) or as conflict between the executed response
and the correct response (Yeung et al., 2004). In any task, a pro-
portion of errors may occur due to pre-emptive responding; it has
been argued that these errors will be higher in conflict than those
errors that occur due to loss of attentional set or impaired stim-
ulus perception as the still evolving representation of the correct
response will conflict with the executed response (Yeung et al.,
2004). These errors will, obviously, be associated with compar-
atively fast RT but may also be more likely to be reported as
participants become aware of both the executed response and
the correct response (Scheffers and Coles, 2000; Shalgi et al.,
2007; Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010). If ACC activity indexes high
conflict trials, we might predict a relationship between activity
in dACC, error awareness, and RT. Consistent with this sug-
gestion, we observed faster RT for aware errors than for either
unaware errors or correct “Go” responses. dACC activity, how-
ever, was not correlated with RT for either aware or unaware
errors. As RT is an indirect measure of response conflict, and
the EAT is not designed to discriminate between high conflict
and low conflict errors, it is possible that this task is not sensi-
tive to the relationship between dACC and conflict (cf. Hughes
and Yeung, 2011). We believe, however, that evaluation of a
response and awareness of its appropriateness most likely occurs
after the response has been executed. In this way, error RT may
affect awareness but would not correlate directly with activity in
regions believed to be associated with error processing (insula,
IPL, dACC).
In the current study, we reported a correlation between activity
in the SMA and aware error RT such that higher levels of activ-
ity in the SMA were associated with slower aware-error RT. SMC
(comprising the SMA and the pre-SMA) is reliably implicated
in successful response inhibition (Aron et al., 2007; Simmonds
et al., 2008; Sharp et al., 2010). As such, elevated activity in
this region associated with aware errors may reflect an insuf-
ficient or belated inhibitory response. Garavan and colleagues
(2002) reported that clusters of BOLD activity in the SMC were
implicated in both successful response inhibition and in commis-
sion errors in a Go/No-go task. By combining the fMRI analysis
with EEG, the authors demonstrated that commission errors were
related to delayed, rather than absent or insufficient, inhibition-
related activity. In the context of the EAT, as participants become
aware of the No-go signal and the drive to inhibit increases, RT
will slow but not enough to facilitate inhibition if the prepotent
“Go” response was initiated prematurely. This slowing of error-
RT is not necessarily a conscious adjustment that depends on
awareness of an imminent error, but it seems probable that aware-
ness of the No-go signal is more likely to produce an attempt to
inhibit the prepotent response and, should this be unsuccessful,
awareness of the error. It has been suggested that the SMC and
the dACC serve complimentary roles in performance monitor-
ing: signaling that we are at imminent risk of committing an error
or that an error has occurred, respectively (Garavan et al., 2003).
It is possible that measures of response conflict indexed by the
SMC contribute to the dACC signal by providing an indication of
the likelihood of an error and, in this way, dACC activity would
covary with response conflict but not correlate directly with error-
RT. Alternatively, activity in the SMA and dACCmay be driven by
activity in another source.
Consistent with previous research using the EAT (Hester et al.,
2005, 2009a), regions in the bilateral IPL discriminated aware
from unaware errors. Along with the ACC and the insula, the
IPL forms part of the frontoparietal control system described
by Vincent and colleagues (2008). Seeley and colleagues (2007)
argued that within this network the dACC and the insula are
associated with the salience of an event and regions in the pari-
etal cortex, including the bilateral IPL, act on events identified
as salient. It has been suggested the role of the IPL in cognitive
control is to maintain sustained attention on task goals (Singh-
Curry and Husain, 2009), task parameters (Dosenbach et al.,
2006), and response contingencies (Bunge et al., 2003). It is likely
that an error constitutes a salient event, and subsequent appli-
cation of cognitive control may cause participants to re-orient
their attention to the task at hand (Coull et al., 1996; Singh-
Curry and Husain, 2009). In the current study, activity in the IPL
was correlated with the post-error adjustment in RT following
an aware error such that elevated levels of BOLD activity pre-
dicted faster responses on the post-error trial. In the context of
the EAT, a salient error may cause an increase in attention to the
task parameters or stimulus-response contingencies, thus affect-
ing the speed with which the error awareness response is made on
the subsequent trial.
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It must be noted that, although activity in the IPL has pre-
viously been associated with error awareness when assessed by
the EAT, this activity did not discriminate aware from unaware
errors in the anti-saccade task (AST: Klein et al., 2007). It is
possible that Klein and colleagues did not observe sensitivity to
errors in the IPL due to insufficient statistical power. Alternatively,
the EAT may induce a task specific effect due to the response
parameters of the Go/No-go task. The EAT requires participants
to acknowledge an error with the “error awareness” response
rather than the prepotent “Go” response; it is possible that activity
in the IPL, pre-SMA, and SMA reflects the intention, prepa-
ration, and initiation of the alternative response (Fried et al.,
1991; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009; Desmurget et al., 2009). We
believe this to be unlikely, as it would require the preparation
of the post-error response to commence during the execution of
the erroneous response. Moreover, a previously published study
using the EAT (Hester et al., 2005) included a condition that
assessed the effect of the additional “awareness” response on
BOLD activity in the absence of an error. Only one region in
the left middle temporal gyrus showed significant activation for
both these odd-ball trials and aware errors, suggesting that the
response demands imposed by the task do not account for addi-
tional activity observed in the IPL and SMC for aware errors.
Unfortunately, this condition was not included in the subsequent
studies using the EAT (Hester et al., 2009a, 2012) so we were not
able to verify this suggestion with more powerful analysis. In the
future, the contribution of the error awareness response to the
dACC activity in this paradigm could be assessed by temporally
dissociating the awareness response from the commission error
itself.
The EAT is not well suited to analyzing post-error behaviors;
as discussed above, post-error RT for aware errors is confounded
by the requirements of the error awareness response. In error
awareness studies using the AST, PES is typically only observed
following aware errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Wessel et al.,
2011) and has been correlated with error-related BOLD activity
in the pre-SMA (Klein et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the observation
of a small but statistically significant degree of slowing following
errors of which the participant was unaware is reliably reported
in studies using the EAT and is consistent with reports from two
recent studies in which errors were induced by presenting some
stimuli below the threshold required for conscious awareness
(Pavone et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2009). Both studies reported
PES following aware and unaware errors, but the degree of slow-
ing was greater following errors of which the participants were
aware. In the current study, PES following unaware errors was
not correlated with the error-related BOLD activity in any of the
functionally defined ROI. Using EEG and Granger causality anal-
ysis, Cohen and colleagues (2009) revealed increased top-down
control over task-relevant sensory regions measured as synchrony
between the medial frontal cortex (MFC) and occipital cortex
(OCC) following commission errors. The strength of the syn-
chrony between MFC and task-relevant regions was observed to
increase following both aware and unaware errors, but was signif-
icantly stronger following aware errors. The authors argued that
increased synchrony may be the means by which MFC enacts cog-
nitive control by enhancing processing in task-relevant regions,
and that this process does not depend on conscious awareness.
The BOLD response measured by fMRI does not represent or
correlate with all patterns of neural activity, so it may be that
increased synchrony leading to PES following unaware errors is
not detected in the univariate BOLD response. It is interesting to
note that Cohen and colleagues reported no correlation between
the degree of PES and the strength of MFC-OCC synchrony; it
is possible that increased synchrony is sufficient to induce the
less pronounced PES observed following unaware errors but that
awareness of the error can induce deliberate remedial strategies
over and above these mechanisms, which modulate the nature or
degree of post-error behaviors. This suggestion is consistent with
the results of Klein and colleagues (2007) in which PES was cor-
related with error-related activity in the pre-SMA, but only for
those errors of which the participant was aware.
It is generally accepted that error awareness is adaptive. Klein
and colleagues (2007) reported that the error rate following
an aware error was significantly lower than that following an
unaware error, suggesting that error awareness improves subse-
quent performance. In the context of a Go/No-go task, Hester and
colleagues (2009b) demonstrated that error-related activity in the
dACC, insula, and IPL predicted successful inhibition on the fol-
lowing No-go trial, occurring up to 20 s later. Although Hester
and colleagues (2009b) did not explicitly assess awareness, when
considered with the results of the current study, it suggests that
error awareness and subsequent inhibition success are subserved
by common neural mechanisms. It is surprising, therefore, that
we observed no correlation between a participant’s level of error
awareness and their overall inhibition performance. The absence
of a relationship between error awareness and inhibition perfor-
mance in the EAT has previously been reported by O’Connell and
colleagues (2009). It is possible that the application of two inhi-
bition contingencies in the EAT disrupts the relationship between
error awareness and subsequent performance, reflecting the role
of dACC activity as a reinforcement learning signal (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Holroyd and Yeung, 2011). This suggestion high-
lights the need for future studies to assess whether error-related
neural activity produces a general, transient increase in the con-
servatism of responding and a subsequent increase in accuracy,
or a context specific, learned adaptation. It would be particu-
larly informative to explore the role of error awareness in these
dynamics.
Although models of performance monitoring have consis-
tently implicated the dACC in error processing, the relation-
ship between activity in this region and error awareness has
not been reported in previously published fMRI investigations
(Hester et al., 2005, 2009a; Klein et al., 2007) and not reli-
ably observed in previously published studies using ERP (Wessel
et al., 2011). The increased statistical power afforded by the
composite sample used in the current study has shown that
error-related BOLD activity in the dACC discriminated aware
from unaware errors, consistent with recent reports of error
awareness sensitivity in the ERN (Steinhauser and Yeung, 2010;
Wessel et al., 2011). Although the results of the present study
are consistent with the longstanding belief of a functional rela-
tionship between the ERN and BOLD activity in the dACC,
Agam and colleagues (2011) have recently suggested that the ERN
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is generated in the PCC. We did not observe error-related BOLD
activity in the PCC, so are unable to comment on Agam and
colleagues’ suggestion that the ERN/PCC response is an error-
specific signal, which is then communicated to the dACC to
facilitate behavioral adjustments. The BOLD response is not a
direct measure of underlying neural activity and it is possible
that the ERN is the result of synchronization of neural popula-
tions or the disinhibition of cortical neurons (Agam et al., 2011),
phenomena that may not produce significant modulation of the
hemodynamic response. It will be necessary to apply multimodal
neuroimaging techniques to various error awareness paradigms
in order to characterize the role of task and performance fac-
tors in the hemodynamic and electrophysiological markers of
performance monitoring. Of particular interest will be explor-
ing the influence of the ways in which error awareness is assessed.
Those experiments that present some stimuli outside of conscious
awareness provide a means of assessing the neural correlates of
error awareness without the need of an additional error aware-
ness response that might be vulnerable to failures of memory, task
switch costs, or response bias (Woodman, 2010). It remains to be
determined whether those errors that occur due to insufficient
stimulus representation are as motivationally significant as those
that occur due to cognitive failures and whether this mediates
error-related neural activity.
The current study has demonstrated a network of regions
associated with the motoric, cognitive, and motivational compo-
nents of performance monitoring that discriminated aware from
unaware errors. Analyzing the performance of 56 participants
revealed error awareness sensitivity in the dACC, but the EAT
does not allow us to determine which performance or contextual
factors influenced the response of this region and the emergence
of error awareness. Our findings are consistent with the sugges-
tion that dACC activity is indirectly related to error awareness and
may feed forward into regions directly responsible for conscious-
ness (Wessel et al., 2011) and remedial post-error behavioral
adjustments. Error-related activity in the dACC is probably best
understood as part of a network in which the constituent regions
are differentially sensitive to the demands of the task and the
performance context, and that error awareness and error-related
behaviors rely on the pattern of activity in this network.
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APPENDIX
In order to generate the constituent maps for error-related activity
associated with aware and unaware errors, group activation maps
were determined with one-sample t-tests against the null hypoth-
esis of zero event-related activation changes (i.e., no change
relative to baseline). Significant voxels within group maps passed
a voxelwise statistical threshold (p ≤ 0.0001) and were required
to be part of a larger 84μl cluster of contiguous significant voxels.
The event-related functional analysis of aware errors identi-
fied nine clusters that showed significantly greater activity asso-
ciated with aware errors than with correct go-trial responses
(Table A1).
The event-related functional analysis of unaware errors identi-
fied eight clusters that showed significantly greater activity asso-
ciated with unaware errors than with correct go-trial responses
(Table A2).
Table A1 | Regions that showed significantly greater BOLD signal change for aware errors than for correct go-trial responses.
Structure Volume µl Brodmann area HS Center of mass (MNI Coordinates)
x y z
Inferior parietal 7776 40 L −48 −40 46
Inferior parietal 6529 40 R 47 −49 40
dACC 4878 32 L 0 9 43
Insula 3020 13 R 44 13 4
Insula 2169 13 L −41 13 3
Middle frontal gyrus 138 46 R 44 39 26
Extrastriate cortex 118 7 L −9 −77 31
Precentral gyrus/SMA 116 4/6 L −28 −27 70
Middle frontal gyrus 84 9 R 39 12 46
Positive values for x, y, and z coordinates denote, respectively, locations that are right, posterior, and superior relative to the anterior commissure. Significance test
results indicate areas of increased activation associated with aware relative to unaware errors assessed using t-test.
Table A2 | Regions that showed significantly greater BOLD signal change for unaware errors than for correct go-trial responses.
Structure Volume µl Brodmann area HS Center of mass (MNI Coordinates)
x y z
Inferior occipital gyrus 260 18 R 33 −87 −11
Middle occipital gyrus 217 19 L −38 −78 −2
Lingual gyrus 164 18 R 17 −81 −14
Middle occipital gyrus 127 19 R 34 −76 −15
Superior temporal gyrus 125 38 R 39 1 −17
Cerebellum (Declive) 98 L −18 −67 −27
Superior temporal gyrus 96 41 R 52 −24 7
Caudate 88 R 13 22 7
Positive values for x, y, and z coordinates denote, respectively, locations that are right, posterior, and superior relative to the anterior commissure. Significance test
results indicate areas of increased activation associated with aware relative to unaware errors assessed using t-test.
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